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Forum on Public Policy

Separation of Church and State, Neutrality, and Religious Freedom in
American Constitutional Law
Robert A. Sedler, Distinguished Professor of Law, Wayne State University
Abstract
Religious freedom is a favored value under the United States Constitution. The Constitution
provides two-fold protection to religious freedom by means of the Establishment Clause and the
Free Exercise Clause. The Establishment Clause protects against the “establishment” of an
official church by the government and against governmental action “establishing religion,” while
the Free Exercise clause is a textual guarantee of peoples’ right to practice their religion and to
hold and act on religious beliefs, free from governmental interference. The Establishment
Clause would appear to an outside observer as strongly endorsing the concept of separation of
church and state, and the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to the Establishment Clause as
creating a “wall of separation” between church and state. However, the concept of separation of
church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause not as
requiring separation of church and state in the sense that the government may not constitutionally
become involved with religion, but as only requiring that the government must maintain a course
of complete official neutrality toward religion. This means that the government may not favor
one religion over another religion and may not favor religious belief over non-religious belief.
But as a constitutional matter, the government may become involved with religion in a number
of ways so long as it maintains a course of complete official neutrality toward religion. It is the
thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom, and that the Court will only
find an Establishment Clause violation when the law or governmental action in question has the
potential for interfering with the religious freedom of individuals or groups who are not the
beneficiaries of that law or governmental action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has
found many Establishment Clause violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or
governmental actions that have the effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This
trend has been particularly evident in recent years with respect to the government’s including the
religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld
against Establishment Clause challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to
protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions. In the final analysis, as
this paper will demonstrate, the function of the Establishment Clause in the American
constitutional system is to protect religious freedom by requiring that the government maintain a
course of complete official neutrality toward religion. The government is not required by the
Establishment Clause to be hostile toward religion, but to the contrary may treat the religious and
the secular equally and may act affirmatively to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions.
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I. Introduction
Religious freedom is a favored value in the American constitutional system.
It is the first guarantee of the First Amendment, which provides that there shall be “[n]o law
respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”1 The First
Amendment was enacted against the background of an established church in Great Britain during
the colonial period and the official persecution of religious dissenters in Great Britain and
colonial America.2 It provides a two-fold protection to religious freedom by what we refer to as
the “religion clauses.” The Establishment Clause protects against the “establishment” of an
official church by the government and against governmental action “establishing religion,” while
the Free Exercise clause is a textual guarantee of peoples’ right to practice their religion and to
hold and act on religious beliefs, free from governmental interference. 3
1

U.S.CONST.amend. I. While the guarantees of the Bill of Rights by their terms apply only to the federal
government, the major guarantees of the Bill of Rights, such as the religion clauses, have been incorporated into the
“liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, and so apply equally to the states. See the
discussion in the concurring opinion of Justice William Brennan in School District of Abington Township,
Pennsylvania v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 230-234 (1963) (Brennan J., concurring).
2
See the discussion of the historical background of the religion clauses of the First Amendment in Everson v. New
Jersey, 330 U.S. 1, 8-14 (1947).
3
As the Supreme Court has stated: “The structure of our government has, for the preservation of religious liberty,
rescued the temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious liberty from
the invasion of civil authority.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 15.
Religious freedom means freedom with respect to religious belief - the belief in the existence or non-existence of a
Supreme Being, and the nature and manifestation of such existence. In this sense, all people, secularists, atheists and
agnostics, as well as religious adherents, have religious beliefs, and the religion clauses protect peoples’ freedom
with respect to those beliefs.
The two-fold protection of religious freedom under the American Constitution is a distinctly American phenomenon.
It is possible in a democratic society for governmental establishment of religion to coexist fully with religious
freedom. This is clearly the situation in Great Britain. In Great Britain, there is not only the officially-established
Church of England and Church of Scotland, supported by public funds, but the government aids other religions by
providing substantial public funds to sectarian schools. See the discussion of governmental funding of sectarian
schools in Governing Body of JFS and the Admission Panel of JFS and others [2009] UKSC 15, 63-65 (Judgment of
Lord Hope), [2010] IRLR 136. At the same time, Great Britain affirmatively protects religious freedom by its
enactment human rights laws and its adherence to the European Convention on Human Rights, much in the same
way and to the same extent as religious freedom is protected under the Free Exercise Clause in the United States.
See e.g., R (on the application of SB) v. Governors of Denbigh High School, 2 All ER 396 [2005], 2005 EXCA Civ
1999 (school could not require student to wear school uniform instead of jilbab, which she claimed was required by
her Moslem religion); R (on the application of Suryanada [2007] EWHC 1736 (Q.B.Admin) (proposed slaughter of
bullock solely on basis of bullock’s testing positively for bovine tuberculosis violated religious freedom of Hindu
community). Similarly, in Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains a freedom of conscience and
religion clause, but no establishment clause. The reason for this is that in Canada the government continues to
support Protestant and Catholic sectarian schools as part of the pact between the Founding Nations at the time of
Confederation.See Adler v. Ontario [1996] 3 S.C.R. 609, where the Supreme Court of Canada held that the refusal
of the province to fund the sectarian schools operated by other religious groups did not violate the freedom of
conscience and religion or the equality provisions of the Charter. Compare Re Zylberberg and Director of Education
of Sudbury Board of Education, 65 O.R.2d 641 (Ontario Court of Appeal 1988), holding that a requirement that
public school students participate in school-sponsored prayer violated the freedom of conscience and religion clause
of the Charter. But our approach is different, and as a matter of constitutional structure, in the United States we
protect religious freedom both by prohibiting the government from “advancing or inhibiting religion” - the
Establishment Clause requires that the government pursue a policy of complete official neutrality toward religion -
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The Supreme Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause very broadly to protect
religious freedom, and as a consequence, the Establishment Clause has supplanted the Free
Exercise Clause as the primary means of protecting religious freedom under the American
Constitution.4
The Establishment Clause would appear to an outside observer as strongly endorsing the
concept of separation of church and state, and the Supreme Court has sometimes referred to the
Establishment Clause as creating a “wall of separation” between church and state.5 However, the
concept of separation of church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. To the contrary, the Court has interpreted the Establishment
Clause not as requiring separation of church and state in the literal sense that the government
may not constitutionally become involved with religion, but only as requiring that the
government must maintain a course of complete official neutrality toward religion. The
requirement of complete official neutrality toward religion is the overriding principle of the
Establishment Clause. Under this overriding principle, the government cannot favor one religion
over another religion and cannot favor religious belief over non-religious belief.6 The overriding
principle of complete official neutrality toward religion has replaced the earlier “wall of
separation concept.7 Or to put it another way, under the Establishment Clause, the objectives to
be achieved by the concept of separation of church and state are achieved by the requirement of
complete official neutrality toward religion. This means that as a constitutional matter, the
government may become involved with religion in a number of ways so long as it maintains a
course of complete official neutrality toward religion.
The neutrality principle furthers the “objective of separation, by precluding the
government from favoring religion, but at the same time, it does not require the government to be
hostile to religion.8 Because the Establishment Clause does not require the government to be
hostile to religion, obviously, the government can include religious institutions in the services it
and by specifically guaranteeing religious freedom. In the United States, as we will see, any school-sponsored prayer
in the public schools violates the Establishment Clause, so its is not necessary for the courts to decide whether the
imposition of the requirement that students participate in school sponsored prayer violates the Free Exercise Clause.
4
See the discussion of this point in Robert A. Sedler, “The Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty in the
United States,” 2010 FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY ON LINE, Vol.5, pp.9-10.
5
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 146, 164 (1879). In
Everson, the first modern Establishment Clause case, Justice Black, writing for the Court stated: “in the words of
Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by law was intended to erect a ‘wall of separation’
between church and State.” Id. at 16 (quoting Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
6
See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60 (1981).
7
The problems with the “wall of separation” concept were pointed out by Justice Douglas in Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306,312 (1952). Justice Douglas noted that while the First Amendment “reflects the philosophy that Church
and State should be separated,” “[it] does not say that in every and all respects there shall be a separation of Church
and State.” Rather, “it studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall be no concert or union
or dependency one on the other.”
8
As the Court noted in Everson: “The First] Amendment requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups
of religious believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is no more to
be used to handicap religions than it is to favor them.” Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.

3

Forum on Public Policy

provides to the public generally, such as police and fire protection,9 and likewise, the
government can include religious institutions among recipients of governmental funding to
provide secular services.10 In addition, the principle of complete official neutrality is not
breached when the government provides religious organizations with equal access to
governmental facilities, such as access to a public forum. This being so, such equal access is
required by the First Amendment freedom of speech principle of content neutrality.11 And as we
will see, at least in certain circumstances, the Court has held that the government does not violate
the Establishment Clause when it includes the religious with the secular in the receipt of
governmental benefits.
It is the thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom. This
being so, I maintain that the Court has found an Establishment Clause violation only when the
law or governmental action in question has the potential for interfering with the religious
freedom of individuals or groups who are not the beneficiaries of that law or governmental
action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has found many Establishment Clause
violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or governmental actions that have the
effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This trend has been particularly evident in
recent years with respect to the government’s including the religious with the secular in the
receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld against Establishment Clause
challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions.
I will now discuss the four situations where the Court’s Establishment Clause
jurisprudence can be demonstrated to have been guided by a concern for protecting religious
freedom. One, the Court has held unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause all
governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief over another
religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief. In so doing, the Court
has protected the religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored religious
beliefs. Two, the Court has protected the religious freedom of religious institutions and their
adherents by holding that under the Establishment Clause0 the government cannot become
involved in matters of religious doctrine or policy and must respect the religiously-based
decisions of religious institutions. Three, the Court has held that at least in some circumstances,
9

As Professor Laycock has noted, police and fire protection are such a universal part of our lives that they have
become part of the baseline, and to deny them to churches would put religion outside the protection of the law.”
Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L.REV. 993,
1005 (1990).
10
See the discussion in Sedler, Understanding the Establishment Clause, infra, note 12 at 1374-1376.
11
See the discussion, Id. at 1331-1338, 1392-1393. See also Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S.
98 (2001) for a discussion of the equal access of religious speech to a designated public forum, here the use of afterschool facilities in a public school.
0
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the Establishment Clause permits the government to include the religious with the secular in the
receipt of governmental benefits, and to that extent the Establishment Clause protects the
religious freedom of religious institutions and religious adherents. Fourth, the Court has held that
the Establishment Clause permits the government to take actions that are precisely tailored to
protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.
II. The Establishment Clause and Protecting Religious Freedom
A. Governmental Action Advancing Religion
The most important operative principle of the Establishment Clause is that the government may
not take any action that has the purpose or effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.12 Most of
the cases decided under this operative principle involve the situation where the government has
taken action that favors religion over non-religion and sometimes that favors a particular religion
over another. First off, the government may not provide public funds to support the religious
activities of churches and other religious institutions. In Everson, Justice Black stated a core
meaning of the Establishment Clause: “No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form
they may adopt to teach or practice religion.” 13 Professor Jesse Choper has observed, “There is
broad consensus that a central threat to the religious freedom of individuals and groups-indeed,
in the judgment of many, ‘the most serious infringement upon religious liberty'-is posed by
‘forcing them to pay taxes in support of a religious establishment or religious activities.’”14 In
addition to precluding the government from providing public funds to churches to be used for
religious activities, the government may not provide public funds directly to sectarian schools,
such as funds for the maintenance and repair of parochial school buildings,15 or an unrestricted
lump-sum grant, purportedly designed to reimburse the parochial schools for the expenses
12

Some years ago, I published a lengthy law review article in which I attempted to explicate the structure of the
Establishment Clause from the perspective of constitutional litigation. Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, 43 WAYNE LAW REVIEW 1317 (1997). I
have recently completed a revisit and updating of that article, Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the Establishment
Clause: A Revisit which will be published in the Wayne Law Review in 2014. In the article, I explain the
Establishment Clause as consisting of four components. An overriding principle: complete official neutrality toward
religion; three operative principles; subsidiary doctrines, and precedents in the main areas of Establishment Clause
Litigation. The three operative principles are based on what is called the Lemon test, first propounded by the Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-613 (1971), but reflecting “the cumulative criteria developed by the Court
over many years.” The first operative principle is that the law or governmental action must have a secular legislative
purpose. The second operative principle is that the principal or primary effect of the law or governmental action
must be neither to advance nor inhibit religion. The third operative principle is that the challenged law or
governmental action may not foster “excessive governmental entanglement with religion.” If either operative
principle is violated, the law or governmental action violates the Establishment Clause. In actual litigation, the
operative principles serve as the point of departure for Establishment Clause analysis. The Lemon operative
principles are discussed in Understanding the Establishment Clause, 43 WAYNE LAW REVIEW at 1343-1351.
13
Everson v. Board of Education, supra, note 2 at 15-16.
14
Jesse H. Choper SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF
THE RELIGION CLAUSES 16 (1995).
15
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
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mandated by state law,16 or funds to supplement the salaries of parochial school teachers in
secular subjects.17 By prohibiting the government from providing funds to churches and religious
institutions to support religious activities, the government is thereby protecting the religious
freedom of those persons who are not members of the church or religious institution. An
essential component of religious freedom in the United States then is the right to be free from
taxation for the benefit of churches and religious institutions.
Next, under this operative principle the Court has held unconstitutional all statesponsored religious practices in the public schools, such as school-sponsored prayers and biblereading,18 the posting of a copy of the Ten Commandments in public school classrooms,19 a
“moment of silence” designed to encourage school prayer,20 and school-sponsored prayers at
school commencements and athletic events.21 Moreover, the government may not try to advance
a biblical view of creation by prohibiting the teaching of evolution in the public schools,22,” or
by requiring the teaching of “creation science” in addition to evolution, based on the Court’s
factual finding that “creation science” was not science, but religion masquerading as science.23

16

Levitt v. Committee for Public Education, 413 U.S. 472 (1977).
Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra, note 12. However, as will be discussed subsequently, infra, note 52 the Establishment
Clause does not prohibit the government from providing funds for secular purposes to most religiously-affiliated
colleges and universities, since they are sufficiently similar to secular colleges and universities in their operation and
function. The Establishment Clause generally permits the government to provide aid to religious institutions in order
to enable them to perform a secular function.
18
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963),
19
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
20
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
21
Lee v. Weissman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000);
22
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
23
Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).The most recent attempt to undermine the teaching of evolution in
some school districts has been to counter evolution with “intelligent design,” purportedly an alternative “scientific”
explanation of the origin of human life. Applying these precedents to the teaching of “intelligent design, a federal
court held an extensive evidentiary hearing, and made comprehensive findings to the effect that like “creation
science, “ ”intelligent design was not science, but religion masquerading as science, so that the teaching of
“intelligent design” in the public schools violated the Establishment Clause. See Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School
District, 400 F.Supp.2d 707 (M.D.Pa.2005). The effect of the District Court decision was to ban the teaching of
“intelligent design” as effectively as if the decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court. The findings were not
only comprehensive, but so strongly supported by expert scientific testimony as to be unassailable. Any school
district motivated to try to put “intelligent design” into the curriculum would be advised by the school board
attorney that the district would be sued in federal court and the federal judge, relying on the findings in the Dover
case, would hold the practice to be violative of the Establishment Clause.
In Tangipahoa Parish Board of Education v. Freiler, 185 F.3d 337 (5 th Cir. 1999), cert.denied, 530 U.S. 1251 (2000), a
school board adopted a resolution that required the teaching of evolution in the schools to be accompanied by a
disclaimer to the effect that “the lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and manner, is known as the
Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of the Scientific Theory of Evolution and
should be presented to inform students of the scientific concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the
Biblical version of Creation or an other concept.” It went on to state that, “Students are urged to exercise critical
thinking and gather all information possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming an opinion.” The
Fifth Circuit found that the disclaimer violated the second Lemon prong, because its primary effect was to “maintain
a particular religious viewpoint, namely belief in the Biblical version of creation.” 185 F.3d at 346-348. The
Supreme Court denied certiorari, over the dissent of Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
17
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This operative principle also precludes the government from sponsoring a display of an
unadorned religious symbol, such as a Nativity Scene, on public property. 24 The display of the
Nativity Scene, standing alone, would perceived by an objective observer as sending a message
of endorsement of Christianity and a message to non-Christians that they are “outsiders and not
full members of the political community.”25 Similarly, the government may not sponsor displays
on public property of the Ten Commandments, because the Ten Commandments is a sacred
religious text for the Jewish and Christian faiths, and so endorses the religious beliefs of those
faiths over other religious beliefs.26 By prohibiting the government from using its power to
endorse the religious beliefs of some faiths over others, the Establishment Clause protects the
religious freedom of those who do not share the “favored” religious beliefs. Again, the
overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is that the government must maintain a course
of complete official neutrality toward religion, and so cannot favor one set of religious beliefs
over another set of religious beliefs and cannot treat those who do not share the “favored” beliefs
as “outsiders and not full members of the political community.27
Thomas, who maintained that the disclaimer was sufficiently neutral and had the secular effect of advancing
freedom of thought.530 U.S. at 1251 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
24
Allegheny County v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573 (1989). The same result was reached in an
earlier lower court case litigated by the author. American Civil Liberties Union v. City of Birmingham, 791 F.2d
1561 (6th Cir.1986) . However, in the United States, Christmas, despite its historically religious origin is observed
primarily as a secular holiday. It is the “national holiday of gift-giving,” so to speak. For this reason, the Court has
held that the government may celebrate Christmas as a secular holiday, so that the inclusion of a Nativity Scene in a
governmentally-sponsored Christmas holiday display, containing a Santa Claus, Christmas trees, and other secular
and commercial symbols of the Christmas season, does not have the religious effect of endorsing Christianity and so
does not violate the Establishment Clause. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Similarly, in Allegheny County
the Court held that the display of Chanukah Menorah, a Jewish religious symbol, which could not be displayed by
the government, standing alone, could be included in a governmentally-sponsored “Salute to Liberty” display next to
a large Christmas tree and a “Salute to Liberty” sign.
25
See the discussion of this point by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Lynch v. Donnelly,
supra, note 24 at 687-689. .
26
McCreary County, Kentucky v. American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005). While the
display of the Ten Commandments, standing alone, would be unconstitutional as an endorsement of the religious
teachings of the Christian faiths, the inclusion of the Ten Commandments in a broader display of historical
documents, showing the foundations of American law,” would have a secular purpose and effect, and so would be
unconstitutional. C.f. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), decided the same day as McCreary, where the
Court held that the display of a monument donated by a private organization that was inscribed with the Ten
Commandments on the grounds of the Texas state capitol, along with 17 other monuments and 21 historical markers
commemorating the “people, ideals and events that compose Texas identity,” had a primarily secular effect and so
did not violate the Establishment Clause. However, in McCreary, the governmental bodies began by posting copies
of the Ten Commandments standing alone in governmental buildings. It was only after the federal courts had held
that the posting of those copies of the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause that the governmental
bodies came up with a new display, consisting of a framed copy of the Ten Commandments, and nine other
documents, such as the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Mayflower Compact, and the like. The
Court found that the new display was undertaken for the religious purpose of displaying the Ten Commandments.
This being so, the display violated the first s24 Lemon operative principle prohibiting governmental actions
undertaken for a religious purpose, and so violated the Establishment Clause.
27
Since the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from giving a preference for one religion over another
religion, the Court has held that it violates the Establishment Clause for a state to require the registration as a
charitable organization and so subject to more extensive regulation of those religious groups that receive more than
half their funds from non-members. Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Similarly, both the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause invalidate laws that expressly discriminate against religion or against people
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B. Non-involvement with religious doctrine and religious institutions
The third Lemon principle of excessive entanglement protects the religious freedom of religious
institutions and their adherents in two ways. This principle means first that the civil courts may
not become involved with matters of religious doctrine or policy, and must defer to the resolution
of these issues by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church authority. Thus, the courts cannot
interfere with the decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to
what persons are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials.28 Nor may they become involved in
disputes between church factions over control of church property, with each group claiming to
have the “true faith.” Again, the courts must defer to the determination of this matter by the
highest tribunal of a hierarchial church organization.29 However, where the form of church
organization is congregational rather than hierarchial, the courts may, consistent with the
Establishment Clause, apply general principles of contract and property law to determine which
of the contending factions is entitled to the church property.30
Second, the excessive entanglement principle may prevent application of general laws to
the activities of religious institutions. In this context, the excessive entanglement principle of the
Establishment Clause may overlap with the Free Exercise Clause, but there is an important
difference. The application of general laws to the activities of religious institutions would only
raise a Free Exercise concern if that application significantly interfered with the ability of the
religious institution to carry out its religious function. But under the excessive entanglement
principle, the government may not apply a general law to the activities of a religious institutions
if the application of the law to those activities would result in governmental interference with
religious-based decisions of the religious institution. The interplay between the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise clause in this situation is illustrated by the recently-decided case of
Hosana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal Employment Opportunity
because of their religious beliefs, such as a law that disqualifies members of the clergy from serving as legislators,
see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), or a law requiring the declaration of a belief in the existence of God as a
test for holding public office. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Art.VI, cl.3 of the Constitution specifically
prohibits a religious test as a qualification for holding federal office. The Torasco decision requires the same result
under the Establishment Clause, so that this prohibition binds the states as well.
It also must be remembered that the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from favoring religious belief
over non-religious belief. So a non-denominational religious display or non-denominational school-sponsored prayer
would also violate the Establishment Clause.
28
See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.696 (1976); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archdiocese, 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
29
See Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94
(1952); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871). These cases and the cases cited in the preceding footnote were
recently discussed by the Supreme Court in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 132 S.Ct. 694, 704-705 (2012), during the course of which the Court
observed that, “Our decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a
church’s determination of who can act as its ministers.”
30
See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
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Commission.31 In that case, the Court held that there was a “ministerial exception” to antidiscrimination laws, and that only the religious institution could decide who had the status of a
“minister” under the applicable religious law.32
The employee in this case was a member of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod and was
employed as a teacher at Hosana-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School, a small
Lutheran parochial school, operated by a Lutheran congregation, and offering a “Christ-entered
education” to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. But under church law she was
considered a “called” teacher rather than a lay teacher. While lay teachers were appointed by the
school board, “called” teachers were regarded as having been called to their vocation by God
through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a teacher had to
satisfy certain academic requirements. One way of doing so was by completing a “colloquy”
program at a Lutheran college or university. The program required candidates to take eight
courses of theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local Synod district and pass an oral
examination by a faculty committee. A teacher who met these requirements could be “called” by
a local congregation. Once “called,” a teacher would receive the formal title of “Minister of
Religion, Commissioned.” A commissioned minister served for an open-ended term, and at
Hosana-Tabor, a call could only be rescinded for cause and by a supermajority vote of the
congregation.33
The employee here was a “called” teacher. She taught secular courses and also taught a
religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and
attended a weekly school-wide chapel service, which she led herself about twice a year.34 When
she became ill with narcolepsy, the congregation put her on disability leave and later concluded
that she would be unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work in the future. The
congregation offered her a “peaceful release” from her call, and tried to negotiate her resignation
from the school. She refused and threatened legal action against the congregation. The
congregation then voted to rescind her call and sent her a letter of termination.35
The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit against
Hosana-Tabor, alleging that the employee had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file a
suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, (ADA),36 and the employee joined the suit,
31

132 S.Ct. 694 (2012).
As Chief Justice Roberts observed in his opinion for the Court: “The Establishment Clause prevents the
government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of
religious groups to select their own . . . By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise
Clause, which protects a religious group’s right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.
According the state the power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the
Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such decisions.” 132 Sup. Ct. at 702-703.
33
Id. at 699.
34
Id. at 700.
35
Id.
36
42 U.S.C. sec. 12101 et seq.
32
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asserting a claim for unlawful retaliation both under the ADA and the state disabilities rights law.
The suit sought her reinstatement to her former position and monetary relief.37 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recognized the existence of a “ministerial exception,”
barring certain employment discrimination claims against religious institutions, but held that the
employee did not qualify as a “minister” under the exception, because the duties of “called”
teachers at the school were the same as the duties of lay teachers.38
The Supreme Court, citing the above cases holding that the courts cannot interfere with the
decisions of the appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what persons are
entitled to serve as ecclesiastical officials,39 The Court found that it was highly relevant that
Hosana-Tabor held the employee out to be a “minister” after she had a completed a course of
religious training, and that it was less relevant both that lay teachers performed the same
religious duties as the “called” teacher and that the “called” teacher also performed secular
duties.40 What appeared to be dispositive for the Court was that the church was entitled to decide
who would be its ministers, and the ministerial exception” “ensures that the authority to select
and control who will be minister to the faithful - - a matter ‘strictly ecclesiastical - - is the
church’s alone.”41
As Hosana-Tabor indicates, an entanglement problem arises when a court or
administrative agency in a suit against a religious institution either applies the law to invalidate a
religiously-based action taken by the institution, or is required to interpret religious doctrine to
order to resolve the particular dispute. Such a situation occurred in a case where a Catholic nun
who had been denied tenure in the Canon Law department of the Catholic University of
America, the national university of the American Catholic Church, brought a Title VII sex
discrimination claim against the university. The United States Court of Appeals for the District
37

Id. at 701.
Id. at 701-702.
39
Supra, notes 27-28, and accompanying text.
40
132 Sup.Ct. at 708-709.
41
Id. at 709 (citations omitted). The Court concluded as follows: “The interest of society in the enforcement of
employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in
choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been
fired sues her church alleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance
for us. The church must be free to choose those who will guide it on its way.” Id. at 710. The Court noted that it was
not deciding in this case whether or not the “ministerial exception” would bar other types of suits by an employee
against a church employer, including actions alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by the church employer.
Id.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Thomas stated that the fact that the church considered the employee a minister should
be dispositive. 132 Sup.Ct. at 710-711 (Thomas, J., concurring). In another concurring opinion, Justices Alito and
Kagan emphasized that the formal ordination and designation of a church employee as a “minister” should not be
controlling in deciding whether the church is entitled to invoke the “ministerial exception.” They pointed out that the
use of the term “minister” or concept of ordination was not followed by some religious groups, and that what
mattered here was that the employee performed important religious functions, so that the church alone had the right
to decide for itself whether she was religiously qualified to remain in her office. 132 Sup.Ct. at 711-716 (Alito,J.,
and Kagan, J., concurring).
38
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of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Establishment Clause precluded the civil courts from
determining the validity of the claim, both because in so doing they would be required to
evaluate the teacher's scholarship and her teaching of religious doctrine, and because the inquiry
itself would intrude into the church's ability to make religious judgments about its officials. 42 By
the same token, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise clause interact to protect
the decision of a religious organization to terminate an employee who has engaged in conduct
that violates the essential tenets of the religion and so renders the employee unfit to advance the
organization’s religious mission, such as where a teacher at a Catholic parochial school, who
had been divorced and had not obtained an annulment of her prior marriage in the Catholic
Church, remarried a man who had been baptized as a Catholic,43 or a teacher at a Catholic
parochial school who engaged in sexual relations outside of marriage.44
We see then that the Establishment Clause protects the religious freedom of religious
institutions and their adherents in two ways. First, the excessive entanglement principle
precludes the civil courts from becoming involved with matters of religious doctrine or policy,
and requires that they must defer to the resolution of these issues by the highest tribunal of a
hierarchial church authority. Second, the Establishment Clause, here sometimes interacting with
the Free Exercise Clause, prevents the application of general laws to the activities of religious
institutions where this would result in an interference with the religiously-based decisions of the
religious officials administering those institutions.45
42

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455 (D.C.Cir.1996).
See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944 (3d Cir. 1991). The teacher was a Protestant and brought a religious
discrimination claim under Title VII. Title VII contains a “religious entity” exception,” under which religious
organizations and religious schools may limit employment to persons of their religion. But if the religious
organization or religious entity does not limit employment to persons of its own religion, it may not avoid the
application of Title VII. In this case, the Third Circuit, in order to avoid a serious constitutional question, construed
the “religious entity” exception very broadly to cover an employee’s conformity with the religious entity’s religious
beliefs.
44
Boyd v. Harding Academy of Memphis, 88 F.3d 410 (6 th Cir. 1996). However, if the teacher was a woman and
became pregnant as a result of having sexual relations outside of marriage, she is entitled to show that she was
discharged because of her pregnancy and not because she had sex outside of marriage, so that her discharge would
violate the federal Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e(k). She can make such a showing by proving
that the policy against having sex outside of marriage was enforced only against pregnant women and not against
men or against women who were not pregnant. Cline v. Catholic Diocese of Toledo, 206 F.3d 651 (6th Cir. 2000).
In a very recent and post-Hosana-Tabor case, an unmarried non-Catholic technology coordinator at a Catholic
parochial school was terminated because she became pregnant by means of artificial insemination. The school
contended that becoming pregnant by means of artificial insemination was a violation of Catholic religious doctrine.
The court held that the “ministerial exception” did not apply to bar her claims and that for purposes of the school’s
motion to dismiss, she had made out a plausible claim of pregnancy discrimination. Dias v. Archdiocese of
Cincinnati, 2012 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 43240, U.S.D.C.S.D. Ohio, March 29, 2012. The court subsequently held,
following discovery by the parties, that there was a sufficient factual dispute over the reasons for her termination
that had to be resolved by a trial of the case.Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 2013 U.S.Dist.LEXIS 12417,
U.S.D.C.S.D. Ohio, January 30, 2012.
45
A different question is presented where the application of general laws to the activities of a religious institution
would interfere with the decisions of the religious officials administering those institutions, although those decisions
might not have involved the application of religious doctrine. But a concern that labor relations decisions might have
involved the application of religious doctrine influenced the Supreme Court to hold Congress did not intend that the
federal National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 151-169, apply to the regulate the unionization of lay faculty
members at parochial schools. National Labor Relations Board v. Catholic Bishop of the City of Chicago, 440 U.S.
43
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490 (1979) The Court said that the National Labor Relations Board’s resolution of unfair labor practices at the
schools would in many instances involve an inquiry into the good faith of the position asserted by clergyadministrators and its relationship to the school’s“religious mission.” 440 U.S. at 501. Because of these
“entanglement” concerns, the Court, invoking the statutory interpretation principle that where possible a statute will
be interpreted so as to avoid a serious question as to its constitutionality, concluded that Congress did not intend
that the Act apply to the unionization of lay faculty members at parochial schools. The Court has also held that
Congress did not intend that non-profit church-affiliated schools be subject to federal unemployment compensation
laws. St. Martin Lutheran Evangelical Church v. South Dakota, 451 U.S. 772 (1981). This decision was based
primarily on general principles of statutory interpretation rather than on a concern with avoiding a serious
constitutional question. However, the Court saw no constitutional problem in applying the federal wages and hours
law to a commercial business operated by a religious organization and staffed by former drug addicts, derelicts, or
criminals before their conversion and rehabilitation by the foundation. The foundation was a nonprofit religious
organization that operated a number of commercial businesses, including service stations, retail clothing and grocery
outlets, roofing and electrical construction companies, a candy company, and a motel. The converted and
rehabilitated workers received no cash salaries but were provided with “food, clothing, shelter, and other benefits.”
Id. at 292. The district court found that these workers were “employees” within the meaning of the federal wages
and hours law under the “economic reality” test of employment. Id. at 291-292. The Court held that the application
of the law to the foundation's commercial businesses did not implicate the Free Exercise Clause because the required
payments in cash to the workers, which they could voluntarily return to the foundation, did not in any way interfere
with their religious beliefs. Id. at 303. The foundation's “entanglement” objection to the record keeping requirements
of the law was rejected on the ground that the routine and factual inquires required by the law “bear no resemblance
to the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government
entanglement with religion.” Id. at 305. Nor did the Court see any constitutional problem in the application of a state
sales and use tax to a religious organization's sale of religious materials. Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of
Equalization, 493 U.S. 378 (1990). See also Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680 (1989),
where the Court held that the Internal Revenue Code's deduction for contributions to charitable and religious
institutions did not include fixed fees paid for spiritual auditing and training services, because the payments were
made in exchange for something of value. The Court noted that disallowing such a deduction avoided Establishment
Clause problems because it did not require the Internal Revenue Service to decide what services and benefits were
religious in nature. 490 U.S. at 694-698.
Because Catholic Bishop was decided on statutory interpretation grounds, it does not serve as a binding precedent with
respect to the application of the Act to non-faculty employees of parochial schools or the application of other federal
laws to the activities of religious organizations. The United State Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
Catholic Bishop was limited to the unionization of teachers at a parochial school, and that the National Labor
Relations Act did apply to the unionization of non-faculty personnel, such as child-care workers, cooks, recreation
assistants, and maintenance workers at a Catholic school for boys. The court also found that the exercise of
jurisdiction over the unionization of these employees did not violate the Establishment Clause. Because the duties of
these employees were overwhelmingly secular, the Board's exercise of jurisdiction over them would not involve the
Board in the school's religious mission, nor would there be any governmental monitoring of the school's religious
activities. NLRB v. Hanna Boys Center, 940 F.2d 1295 (9 th Cir. 1991), cert.denied, 504 U.S. 1295 (1992).
In a similar vein, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held that the federal Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. secs. 621-634, was applicable to age discrimination claims brought by a lay teacher
against his parochial school employer. In holding that the application of the law to such claims did not violate the
Establishment Clause, the court emphasized that the sole question in an age discrimination case was whether an
employee had been unjustly discriminated against because of age. No Establishment Clause problem would be
presented when the parochial school employer asserted that the employee was discharged not because of his age, but
for religiously-based reasons. In such a case the court could not inquire into the plausibility of the religiously-based
reasons. The inquiry is limited to the question of whether, in fact, the employee was discharged for the asserted
religiously-based reasons or was discharged because of his age. DeMarco v. Holy Cross High School, 4 F.3d 166
(2d Cir.1993). The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reached the same conclusion in an age
discrimination claim brought by the administrator of a Jewish synagogue. Weissman v. Congregation Sharre Emeth,
38 F.3d 1038 (8th Cir.1994).
These cases have not been qualified by subsequent cases and are not affected by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Hosana Tabor, since they involved only lay employees of a religious institution. As these cases indicate, the mere
fact that a court or governmental agency exercises jurisdiction over employment relations at a religious institution
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Thus far, we have seen how the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to hold
unconstitutional governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief
over another religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief and
governmental actions that would have involved the government in matters of religious doctrine
and policy. We have said that these declarations of unconstitutionality have protected the
religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored religious beliefs and have
protected the religious freedom of religious institutions and their adherents. We now turn to the
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause where the Court has found that the challenged
law or governmental action does not violate the Establishment Clause and will demonstrate how
these decisions also have had the effect of protecting the religious freedom of religious
institutions and religious adherents.
C. The Inclusion of the Religious with the Secular in the Receipt of Governmental Benefits
First, applying the doctrine of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion, the Court has
held that at least in some circumstances, the Establishment Clause permits the government to
include the religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental benefits. To the extent that
the government is permitted under the Establishment Clause to include the religious with the
secular in the receipt of governmental benefits, the Establishment Clause thus protects the
religious freedom of those religious individuals and religious institutions that are permitted to
receive the benefit.
The most important benefit for religious institutions resulting from this interpretation of
the Establishment Clause is that the Court has held that a property tax exemption for non-profit
institutions that includes churches and religious institutions, did not violate the Establishment
Clause.46 The inclusion of church property in the exemption was said to promote “benevolent
neutrality” toward religion,47 and avoided the “entanglement” problems that could result from
governmental valuation of church property for tax purposes and enforcement of the tax against
church property.48
Nonetheless, the property tax exemption for church property conferred a very valuable
financial benefit on churches, and like any other tax exemption, effectively subsidized the
churches' activity. The effect of Walz is to allow the state to provide a financial benefit to
religion through a tax exemption when it could not provide such a benefit through a direct
does not necessarily create an entanglement problem. An entanglement problem only arises when the court or
agency either applies the law to invalidate an action that was religiously-based or is required to interpret religious
doctrine to resolve the particular dispute.
46
Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
47
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669, 671-673.
48
Id. at 674-676.
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grant.49 Crucial to the Court's holding in Walz is the matter of inclusion. The tax exemption was
for all non-profit institutions. Therefore, churches qualified for the grant, not because they were
churches, but because they were included within the class of non-profit institutions. As one
commentator put it, “those institutions shared a relevant nonreligious attribute with secular
institutions.”50 There is no doubt that a property tax exemption for churches alone would violate
the Establishment Clause as a preference for religion, notwithstanding that such an exemption
would avoid the “entanglement” problems that the Court identified in Walz. This point is
demonstrated by the fact that the Court has held unconstitutional an exemption from the state
sales tax law for “[p]eriodicals that are published or distributed by a religious faith and that
consist wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly
of writings sacred to a religious faith.”51 In other words, it is the matter of the inclusion of the
religious with the secular that marks the distinction between the constitutionally permissible
equal treatment of religion and the constitutionally impermissible preference for religion.52
49

See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It”: The Supreme Court and Establishment. 59 S.CAL. L.
REV. 495, 500-501 (1986). Professor Marshall notes that the tax exemption in Walz provided a more significant
benefit to religion than any other, so that the result is inconsistent with the Establishment Clause objective of
prohibiting financial aid to religion. Professor Choper also attacks the result in Walz as endangering religious
liberty because the effect of the exemption is to allow tax funds to be expended for religious purposes. See Jesse H.
Choper, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
RELIGION CLAUSES 37 (1995)..
50
Abner S. Greene, “The Political Balance of the Religion Clauses,” 102 YALE L.J. 1611, 1627 (1993).
51
Texas Monthly,Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
52
See Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 115, 184 (1992). As Professor
McConnell has observed: “When the government provides no financial support to the nonprofit sector except for
churches, it aids religion. But when the government provides financial support to the entire nonprofit sector,
religious and nonreligious institutions alike, on the basis of objective criteria, it does not aid religion. It aids higher
education, health care, or child care; it is neutral to religion.”
By the same token, the government does not violate the Establishment Clause when it provides financial aid to a
religious institution, such as a religiously-affiliated hospital, to enable that institution to perform a secular function.
The funding has a secular purpose (the first Lemon principle), and does not have the primary effect of advancing
religion (the second Lemon principle), and so the funding does not violate the Establishment Clause. See Bradfield
v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), where in what appears to be the first Establishment Clause case to come before the
Supreme Court, the Court saw no possible Establishment Clause objection to Congress’ providing funding to a
Washington, D.C. charitable hospital operated by a religious order pursuant to a contractual arrangement by which
the hospital agreed to devote two-thirds of its patient capacity for indigent District of Columbia residents. The Court
will also assume that the religious institution will carry out the secular function “in a lawful, secular manner,” and
will not use the funding to achieve religious objectives. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), where the
Court held that the government could include a religiously-affiliated organization in a program of grants to private
organizations to provide counseling for the prevention of adolescent sexual relations and care for pregnant
adolescents and adolescent parents. The Court also held that it would not presume that the organization would use
the grant to advance its religious views on adolescent sexual relations, and that only if such a showing could be
made by opponents of the grant would the grant be revoked.
The proposition that the government can provide funding to religiously-affiliated institutions in order to enable them
to perform a secular function has been relied on by the Supreme Court to uphold federal assistance to churchaffiliated colleges and universities. Crucial to this holding was the Court's “constitutional finding of fact” that most
church-affiliated colleges and universities are sufficiently similar to secular colleges and universities in their
educational operation, so that providing them with governmental funding will not have the effect of “advancing
religion.” Nonetheless, the particular funding program involved in these cases did not take the form of a general
grant to the institution, but was targeted for specific secular purposes and was upheld on that basis. Where a churchaffiliated college or university operates a distinctly sectarian program, such as a divinity school, an unrestricted
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Because the inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of a governmental benefit
does not necessarily violate the Establishment Clause, an Establishment Clause violation would
only occur when the inclusion of the religious in the particular benefit is inconsistent with a
specific Establishment Clause principle or doctrine. We have earlier discussed governmental
financial assistance to the educational function of parochial schools.53 The Court has held that
governmental financial assistance that takes the form of “aid to the school”, such as paying the
salaries of parochial school teachers of secular subjects, violates the Establishment Clause,
notwithstanding that the government also pays the salaries of teachers of secular subjects in the
public schools.54 The government would also violate the Establishment Clause by sending public
school teachers of basic subjects into the parochial schools, since this form of financial
assistance would “relieve sectarian schools of costs they otherwise would have borne in
educating their students” and would “have the effect of advancing religion by creating a financial
incentive to undertake sectarian education.”55 The same would be true of a program providing
grants to both parochial and public schools for the repair of school buildings.56
However, while the Court has held that governmental assistance to the educational
function of parochial schools is unconstitutional when the assistance takes the form of “aid to the
school,” in the leading case of Everson v. New Jersey,57 the Court drew a sharp distinction
between “aid to the school” and “aid to the child” who is attending a parochial school. Because
of the necessary admixture of the religious and secular in parochial school education, in Everson
the Court proceeded on the assumption that any form of direct governmental assistance to
parochial schools would violate the Establishment Clause, since it would advance the religious
function of the schools.58 But at the same time the Court held that the Establishment Clause is
not violated when the governmental funding takes the form of “aid to the child” who is attending
grant would presumably violate the Establishment Clause because it would have the effect of supporting, to some
degree, the institution's sectarian program .See Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (involving
grants to defray part of expense of educating students in private colleges and universities, including grants to
religiously-affiliated institutions that had given “adequate assurance that funds would be used for a secular
purpose”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973) (involving state-issued revenue bonds that could be used by
church-affiliated colleges and universities to borrow funds to finance construction of facilities used for secular
purposes); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S, 672 (1971)(involving federal construction grants to church-affiliated
colleges and universities for buildings and facilities used exclusively for secular purposes). Because these churchaffiliated colleges and universities are considered to be essentially secular institutions, there is also no Establishment
Clause problem when the government provides financial assistance to students attending such colleges. See e.g.,
Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. Blanton, 433 F.Supp. 97 (M.D.Tenn.), aff’d. mem., 434
U.S. 803 (1977). But if a particular church-affiliated college or university is found by a court to be a primarily
sectarian institution, any governmental aid to that institution, of course, violates the Establishment Clause. See, e.g.,
Habel v. Industrial Dev. Auth., 400 S.E.2d 516 (Va. 1991) (holding that Jerry Falwell's Liberty University was a
sectarian institution so that the city's issuance of construction bonds for educational facilities at the university
violated the Establishment Clause).
53
See the discussion, supra, notes 13-16, and accompanying text.
54
See the discussion of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), supra, note 16, and accompanying text.
55
See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
56
See Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist, supra note 14.
57
Supra, note 2.
58
Everson, 330 U.S. at 14-16.
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the parochial school. Once the Court drew this distinction in Everson,59 it was clear that the
state’s providing bus transportation to parochial school students in that case fell on the side of
“aid to the child” and so was constitutionally permissible. Applying the Everson precedent, the
Court has held that a state could constitutionally provide parochial school students with the same
kinds of individual-based benefits that it provides to public school students, such as loaning the
parochial school students the same textbooks in secular subjects that it loaned to public school
students,60 including parochial school students in programs that loaned the students educational
materials and equipment such as library books and computer hardware and software,61 providing
diagnostic services in which state employees would go into the parochial schools to test
individual children for particular health and educational problems,62 providing a sign-language
interpreter for a hearing-impaired student at a parochial school when it provided a sign-language
interpreter for hearing-impaired students in the public schools,63 and sending public school
teachers into the parochial school buildings to teach certain “enrichment” secular subjects and to
provide remedial instructional services for low-income students.64 The permissibility of aid to
children attending parochial schools was relied on by the Court to hold that where the state
established a program to enable students with disabilities to receive an education so that they
could acquire a marketable skill, the state did not violate the Establishment Clause by paying the
tuition of a blind student to attend a sectarian college in order to receive an education that would
enable him to pursue a religious vocation.65 However, while the state is permitted by the
59

While this distinction has been criticized by some academic commentators as focusing on the form of aid rather
than on its substance and effect, see e.g., William P. Marshall, “Toward a Nonunifying Theory of Unconstitutional
Conditions: The Example of the Religion Clauses, 26 SAN DIEGO L.REV. 243, 246-47 (1989), it has been
consistently applied and never questioned by the Court.
60
Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
61
Mitchell v.Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). Here the program took the form of the federal government distributing
funds to state and local governmental agencies that in turn loaned the educational materials and equipment to
elementary schools, including private and parochial schools. The materials provided to the private and parochial
schools had to be “secular, neutral and nonideological.” Five Justices took the position that the program had to
contain “divertibility” safeguards to ensure that the materials and equipment would not be used for religious
purposes. Two of these Justices found that the program had adequate “divertibility” standards, and combined with
the four Justices who took the position that “divertibility” standards were not required, since the funds were
allocated on the basis of neutral, secular criteria, resulted in a 6-3 majority to uphold the constitutionality of the
program.
62
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977). See also Lemon, 330 U.S. at 616, discussing the providing of school
lunches to parochial school students. Providing individualized services or school lunches or immunizations to
parochial school students in the parochial schools means only that the school is the conduit for the distribution of a
governmental benefit to the children.
63
Zoberst v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
64
Agostini v. Felton, supra, note 55. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). The significance of Agostini in this regard was that the
Court had previously held that the remedial instructional services could not be provided in the parochial school itself
because of concerns that doing so would create an impermissible “symbolic union” between the state and the
parochial school. As a result, these remedial instructional services were provided off-premises, usually in mobile
facilities parked on the parochial school grounds. These prior holdings were overruled in Agostini. So long as public
school employees provide the remedial instruction, they can do so in the parochial school building.
65
Witters v. Washington Department of Social Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986) The purpose of the
program was to enable students with disabilities to receive an education so that they could acquire a marketable
skill, and the most logical place for him to do so would be at a sectarian college.
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Establishment Clause to include religious study in a program of financial assistance to college
students, it is not required by the Free Exercise Clause to do so. For this reason, a state does not
violate the Free Exercise Clause when it denies financial assistance to a student pursuing a
degree in “devotional theology.” Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). The state’s refusal to
provide financial assistance to a student pursuing a degree in “devotional theology” was based on
a “no aid provision” in the state constitution, Wash.Const., Art. I, sec. 11, which states that, “No
public money or property shall be appropriated for or applied to any religious worship, exercise
or instruction, or the support of any religious establishment.” The Court held that the ban on
funding for study in “devotional theology” advanced a valid state “anti-establishment” interest
and noted that the state did provide scholarships for study at pervasively sectarian institutions so
long as the student was not pursuing a degree in “devotional theology.” 540 U.S. at 724-725.
Compare Colorado Christian University v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245 (10th Cir.2008), where the
court found unconstitutional as distinguishing between religions, a state scholarship program that
provided funding for students attending sectarian institutions, but denied funding for students
attending institutions that were “pervasively sectarian.”
Closely related to the distinction between constitutionally impermissible “aid to the
school” and constitutionally permissible “aid to the child” is the distinction between “aid to the
school” and “aid to the parents of children attending a parochial school.” The state assists the
educational function of parochial schools when it gives tax benefits to parents who send their
children to parochial schools. Presumably, this form of aid reduces the costs of parochial school
education and therefore, provides a financial incentive for parents to send their children to
parochial schools. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist66 the
Court held unconstitutional the state’s grant of a tax credit for school tuition paid by parents
whose children were attending private or parochial schools. The Court reasoned that by lowering
the costs of parochial school education for these parents, the state was subsidizing parochial
school education, and held that this subsidization violated the Establishment Clause.67 However,
in the later case of Mueller v. Allen,68 the Court held that there was no Establishment Clause
violation when the state allowed all parents across the board to take a tax deduction, as opposed
to a tax credit, for educational expenses, notwithstanding that 96% of the deductions were taken
for parochial school tuition.
Some academic commentators were troubled by the implications of the Mueller decision,
especially insofar as it indicted that the Establishment Clause was not violated, simply because
the tax deduction made it easier for parents to exercise a private choice to send their children to
parochial schools.69 There is no doubt that the Court could have held that the tax deduction in
66

413 U.S. 756 (1973).
413 U.S. at 794.
68
463 U.S.388 (1983).
69
See Gary J. Simson, “The Establishment Clause in the Supreme Court: Rethinking the Court’s Approach, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 905, 926 (1987). Professor Simson says that the tax deduction has a substantial effect of
supporting religion with public funds….” Although a tax deduction is not an expenditure of public funds in form, it
67
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Mueller, like the tax credit in Nyquist, violated the Establishment Clause, because the practical
effect of the deduction was to subsidize parochial school education. But the Court did not do so.
Again, as we saw with respect to the property tax exemption for non-profit institutions that
includes churches and religious institutions, it is precisely the inclusion of the religious with the
secular in a receipt of a governmental benefit that marks the distinction between the
constitutionally permissible equal treatment of religion and the constitutionally impermissible
preference for religion. Here the tax deduction was one of many provided by the state to
taxpayers, it was available to all parents who incurred educational expenses, and the decision to
use the tax deduction to defray the cost of parochial school education was the result of the
private choice by parents to send their children to parochial schools. Mueller thus holds that he
state may provide tax benefits for parents of all schoolchildren, notwithstanding that most of the
tax benefits are claimed by parents of children attending parochial schools.
The matter of “aid to the parents of children attending parochial schools” and “individual
choice” proved dispositive in the Court’s 2002 decision of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,70 where
the Court first addressed the question of whether the Establishment Clause prohibited statesponsored voucher programs that included vouchers to defray the cost of attendance at parochial
schools. The facts of that case are very important in regard to the inclusion of the religious with
the secular in the receipt of a governmental benefit. In that case, Ohio had set up a pilot
program designed to increase the choices of lower-income parents with children in the Cleveland
public schools, which, according to the Court, “have been among the worst performing public
schools in the Nation.”71 The program contained both a tuition aid component and a tutorial aid
component. Under the tuition aid component, private schools, both non-religious and parochial,
could participate in the program and accept eligible students, so long as the school was located
within the boundaries of the Cleveland school district. Public schools located in a district
adjacent to the Cleveland school district could also participate in the program. All the
participating schools were required to accept Cleveland school students in accordance with rules
promulgated by the state superintendent. Tuition aid was distributed to parents according to
financial need. If the parents chose a private or parochial school, checks were made payable to
the parents, who then endorsed the checks over to the chosen school72 Virtually all of the
students participating in the tuition grant program enrolled in parochial schools. In addition to
plainly is so in fact. Moreover, by relieving parents of a tangible part of the cost of educating their children in public
schools, this deduction materially increases the likelihood that parents contemplating sending their children to
parochial school will decide to do so.”; Jesse H. Choper,”The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial Schools An Update, 75 CAL.L.REV. 5, 9-10 (1987).. Professor Choper says that Mueller is indistinguishable from Nyquist.
In both instances, the state was trying to provide some financial relief to parents who sent their children to private
schools, including parochial schools.Id. at 8. He contends that it should not matter that the law in Mueller was
facially neutral, while the law in Nyquist expressly favored religion, as the record showed that 96% of the tax
deductions under the law were taken for parochial school payments. Id. at 9. He concludes that the decision in
Mueller “opened a large window for aid to parochial schools.” Id. at 11.
70
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
71
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. at 644.
72
Id. at 645-646.
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the tuition aid and tutorial assistance programs, the Cleveland school district set up programs for
community or charter schools, which were funded by the state, but were operated by their own
school boards instead of by the Cleveland school district. For each child enrolled in a community
school, the school received state funding that was twice the funding received by a school
participating in the tuition aid program. The school district also operated magnet schools that
emphasized a particular subject area, teaching method or service to students. For each student
enrolled in a magnet school, the school district received the same amount of funding as it
received for students enrolled at a traditional public school.73
In a 5-4 decision, the Court held that the inclusion of vouchers for parochial schools in the
Cleveland tuition assistance program did not violate the Establishment Clause. The opinion of
the Court by Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined in by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas, invoked the “aid to the parent” and “private choice” rationale of Mueller and other
cases.74 According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, these cases “make clear that where a government
aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and that provides assistance directly to a broad
class of citizens who, in turn, direct government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of
their own genuine and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to a
challenge under the Establishment Clause.”75 This was because, “A program that shares these
features permits government aid to reach religious institutions only by way of the deliberate
choice of numerous individual recipients,” so that, “The incidental advancement of a religious
mission, or the perceived endorsement of a religious message, is reasonably attributable to the
individual recipient, not to the government, whose role ends with the disbursement of the
benefits.”76 The Chief Justice went on to point out that there were no “financial incentives” that
would “skew” the program toward parochial schools, since the aid was “allocated on the basis of
neutral, secular criteria that neither favor or disfavor religion,” and that in fact the program
created “financial disincentives” for religious schools, with private and parochial schools
receiving only half the assistance given to charter schools and only one-third the assistance given
to magnet schools.77 He also rejected the contention that the state was creating a public
perception that it was “endorsing religious practices and beliefs,” since the program was a
neutral one of private choice, “where state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the
numerous independent decisions of private individuals,” and that there was no evidence that the

73

Id. at 648. Approximately 75,000 students were enrolled in the Cleveland school district when these programs
went into operation. About 3,700 students were enrolled in the tuition aid program, about 1,400 received tutorial
assistance, about 1,900 were enrolled in charter schools, and about 13,000 were enrolled in magnet schools. Id. at
646-648.
74
Including Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), and Zoberst v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1 (1993)
75
Zelman, 536 U.S. at 652.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 653.
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program failed to provide genuine opportunities for Cleveland parents to select secular
educational opportunities for their school-age children.”78
The Zelman decision provides a roadmap for states and school districts wishing to adopt
voucher programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools. The voucher
program must be filtered through the parents of children attending parochial schools and must
include a number of other alternatives to the use of vouchers for attendance at parochial schools.
However, the use of voucher programs since Zelman has been relatively limited, and while a
number of voucher programs of one sort or another have been adopted, voucher programs,
particularly those that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools, have not become a
major part of the American educational system.79 Be that as it may, Zelman is another example
of the permissible inclusion of the religious with the secular in the receipt of governmental
benefits.
By drawing a sharp distinction between the constitutionally impermissible “aid to the
school” and the constitutionally permissible “aid to the child,” including aid to the parents of
children attending parochial schools, the Court has enabled the government to provide significant
78

Id. at 655. Justices O’Connor and Thomas, in a concurring opinion, insisted that the decision was not a “dramatic
break from the past,” and emphasized that a “true private choice” inquiry “should consider all reasonable
educational alternatives to religious schools that are available to parents.” 536 U.S. at 663 (O’Connor,J.,
concurring). Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented, insisting that public funds would be
supporting the teaching of religion and that this result was not obviated by the fact that the governmental support for
the teaching of religion comes about through “private choice.” 536 U.S. at 669-700 (Souter, J., dissenting.
79
For discussions of voucher programs since 2002, see Jim Carl, “Freedom of Choice [electronic resource];
vouchers in American education (Praeger 2011) (“[t]he growth of school vouchers has been anemic since 2002");
Lenford C. Sutton & Richard A. King, “School Vouchers in a Climate of Political Change, “ 36 JOURNAL OF
EDUCATION FINANCE 244-267, Winter, 2011); “Keeping Informed About School Vouchers,” CENTER ON
EDUCATION POLICY, July, 2011).
There are three reasons why voucher programs have not become a major part of the American educational system..
In the first place, the Court in Zelman made it clear that vouchers for attendance at private and parochial schools
must be only one component of a larger program involving a number of other alternatives for parents of children
enrolled in the public schools. This being so, a state or school district cannot do vouchers “on the cheap,” so to
speak, but must devote considerable resources to providing other alternatives. Second and more importantly, 39
states have state constitutional “no aid” provisions that preclude the use of state funds for the support of “sectarian
or denominational schools,” see Sutton and King, “School Vouchers” at 248-251, Table 2, for a summary of “no
aid” clauses in state constitutions, and these and related provisions, such as “uniformity” and “local control,” have
been interpreted by some state courts as prohibiting voucher programs that include vouchers for attendance at
parochial schools. See Cain v. Horn, 220 Ariz. 77, 202 P.2d 1178 (2009); Chittenden Town School District v.
Department of Education, 169 Vt. 310, 738 A.2d 539 (1999); Owens v. Colorado Congress of Parents, Teachers and
Students, 92 P.2d 933 (Colo.2004); Holmes v. Bush, 919 So.2d 392 (Fla.2006). Third, and probably most
importantly, has been the rise in charter schools, which are publicly-funded non-sectarian schools operated under
contract between the state or public school systems and private companies. Charter schools give parents of children
attending public schools an alternative to avoid the public schools, often with a greater degree of parental control.
The availability of charter schools, has clearly reduced public pressure for voucher programs. According to Mr.
Carl, “Freedom of Choice,” at 199, as of 2010, charter schools operated in 40 states and the District of Columbia,
enrolling nearly 2 million students. He suggests that, “In the first decade of the new century, state legislatures and
voters were more attracted to charter schools than they were to voucher programs, perhaps because charter schools
avoided church state entanglements.” So, while the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of voucher
programs that include vouchers for attendance at parochial schools, such programs are not widespread in the United
States today.
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financial assistance to the educational function of parochial schools. 80 And to this extent, the
Court’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause has served to protect the religious freedom of
parents who want their children to attend parochial schools.
Second, again applying the principle of the non-discriminatory inclusion of religion, the
Court has held that providing religious groups along with secular groups with the equal access to
public facilities for purposes of expression does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Court
has held that providing equal access to public facilities for religious groups does not have the
effect of advancing religion, it does not create a symbolic union between government and
religion, and it does not constitute governmental endorsement of the religious group's message.
Once the Court has held that providing equal access to religious groups does not violate the
Establishment Clause, the freedom of expression component of the First Amendment comes into
play. Under the First Amendment principle of content neutrality and the public forum doctrine,
whenever the government designates public property or facilities as a public forum, it must
provide all groups equal access to the property for the purpose of expression. Since providing
equal access to religious groups for purposes of expression does not violate the Establishment
Clause, the government is constitutionally required to provide such access under the First
Amendment’s public forum doctrine.81 This is another example of how the Court’s
interpretation of the Establishment Clause has resulted in protecting the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions.
D. Governmental Actions Protecting the Religious Freedom of Individuals and Religious
Institutions
We have previously pointed out that the Establishment Clause renders unconstitutional certain
actions that directly interfere with the religious freedom of individuals and religious
institutions.82 Moreover, as we have discussed previously, under the third Lemon principle of
80

In an interesting article, Professor Richard C. Schragger, says that the effect of the Zelman v. Harris” aid to the
parent rational is to insulate the public subsidization of private religious activity from Establishment Clause concern
and to eliminate inquiry into matters such as “divertibility” or the “pervasively sectarian” character of the institution
to which the aid flows. The only constitutional requirement, he says, is one of neutrality and even-handedness.
Richard C. Schragger, “The Role of the Local in the Doctrine and Discourse of Religious Liberty,” 117
HARV.L.REV. 1810, 1857-58 (2004).
81
See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (statehouse plaza dedicated as a
public forum); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (after-school use of
school facilities by private groups); Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990)
(facilities of public schools available for use by student groups); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (facilities
of state university available for use by student groups); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995)
(university’s policy of paying printing costs of student publications as applied to require payment of printing costs
for publication of student religious organization). See also, John H. Garvey, “All Things Being Equal . . ., 1996
B.U.LREV. 587, 588-92 discussing the interaction between the Establishment Clause, the First Amendment public
forum doctrine, and the content neutrality principle in this situation..
82
See the discussion, supra, note 27. Since the Establishment Clause prohibits the government from giving a
preference for one religion over another religion, the Court has held that it violates the Establishment Clause for a
state to require the registration as a charitable organization and so subject to more extensive regulation of those
religious groups that receive more than half their funds from non-members. Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
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excessive entanglement, the civil courts may not become involved with matters of religious
doctrine or policy, but must defer to the resolution of these issues by the highest tribunal of a
hierarchial church authority.83 Finally, as we have discussed previously, the excessive
entanglement principle may prevent application of general laws to the activities of religious
institutions.84
Now we will discuss how the Court has interpreted the Establishment Clause to uphold as
constitutional affirmative efforts on the part of the government to protect the religious freedom
of individuals and religious institutions. Here we see the interaction of the Establishment Clause
with the Free Exercise Clause to advance the constitutional value of religious freedom. The
operative principle in this area may be stated as follows. Governmental action that has the effect
of providing a preference for religion over non-religion violates the Establishment Clause. But
governmental action that is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions does not violate the Establishment Clause. The crucial question in these
cases, therefore, is whether the governmental action is an unconstitutional preference for
religion, or a precisely tailored and so constitutionally permissible means of protecting the
religious liberty of individuals and religious institutions.85
Let me explain why this is so. When the government gives a preference for religion over
non-religion, it is violating the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause, which is that the
government must pursue a course of complete official neutrality toward religion. This overriding
principle is not obviated by the claim that the government is trying to make an “accommodation”
for religion. It is precisely because the overriding principle of the Establishment Clause is one of
complete official neutrality toward religion that the government may not make an
Similarly, both the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause invalidate laws that expressly discriminate
against religion or against people because of their religious beliefs, such as a law that disqualifies members of the
clergy from serving as legislators, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978), or a law requiring the declaration of a
belief in the existence of God as a test for holding public office. Torasco v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961). Art.VI,
cl.3 of the Constitution specifically prohibits a religious test as a qualification for holding federal office. The
Torasco decision requires the same result under the Establishment Clause, so that this prohibition binds the states as
well.
83
See the discussion, supra, notes 28-30, and accompanying text. As the Supreme Court stated in Everson, supra
note 2 at 16: “Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any
religious organizations or groups and vice-versa.”Thus, the courts cannot interfere with the decisions of the
appropriate ecclesiastical authority within the church as to what persons are entitled to serve as ecclesiastical
officials. Nor may they become involved in disputes between church factions over control over church property,
with each group claiming to have the “true faith,” but must defer to the determination of which group has the “true
faith” that has been made by the highest tribunal of a hierarchial church organization.
84
See the discussion, supra, notes 31-45, and accompanying text. This application of the excessive entanglement
principle was involved in the Supreme Court’s most recent Establishment Clause decision, Hosana Tabor
Evangelical Lutheran Church, 132 Sup.Ct. 694 (2012), where the Court held that there was a ministerial exception to
anti-discrimination laws, and that only the religious institution could decide who had the status of a “minister” under
religious law.
85
I have discussed this interaction more fully under the heading of “Preference for Religion” and the subsidiary
doctrine of “Accommodation for Religious Freedom, But Not for Religion,” in Robert A. Sedler, Understanding the
Establishment Clause: The Perspective of Constitutional Litigation, supra, note 12 at 1419-1437.
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“accommodation” for religion by giving a preference for religion over non-religion. Thus, the
Court has found a preference for religion in violation of the Establishment Clause in the
following cases: a state law providing an exemption from the state sales tax for religious
periodicals alone; 86a state law that gave churches the power to prevent the issuance of a liquor
license to a business that would be located within 500 feet of the church; 87 a state law setting up
a special school district embracing the boundaries of a religious community;88 and a state law
entitling an employee to take off work on the day that the employee stated that he or she
observed as the Sabbath, without any requirement that the employee’s religion precluded the
employee from working on the Sabbath or even that the employee used that day for religious
purposes.89
Conversely, when the government takes action that is precisely tailored to protect the
religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions, the government is acting to protect the
religious freedom that is the primary concern of both the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause. Since religious freedom is a favored constitutional value under the American
Constitution, it would be inconsistent with the overriding purpose of the religion clauses, taken
together, to hold that the Establishment Clause precludes the government from taking such
action. It is irrelevant in this regard that the failure of the government to take such action and that
the application of facially neutral laws to individuals and religious institutions would not violate
the Free Exercise Clause.90 The measure of what the government cannot constitutionally do is
not the measure of what the government is constitutionally permitted to do. So long as the
government’s action is precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions, that action advances the overriding purpose of the religion clauses and so
does not violate the Establishment Clause.
In order to satisfy the standard of “precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of an
individual or religious institution,” the action must be directed toward obviating an interference
with religious freedom. An interference with an individual’s religious freedom occurs when the
individual is prevented from doing something that his or her religion requires, such as when a
member of the Native-American Church is being prevented from using peyote in a religious
ceremony, or when someone is compelled to do something that the person’s religion prohibits,
such as being compelled to work on the Sabbath, which the religion dictates be a day of complete
86

Texas Monthly,Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
Larkin v. Grendel’s Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
88
Board of Education v. Kiryas Joel Village School District, 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
89
Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
90
As a general proposition, the Free Exercise Clause does not require that the government exempt the religiouslymotivated conduct of individuals from neutral and generally applicable laws. See e.g., Employment Division v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), where the Court held that the government could constitutionally prohibit the use of
peyote in the religious services of the Native American Church. See generally the discussion of “The Role of the
Free Exercise Clause” in Robert A. Sedler, “The Constitutional Protection of Religious Liberty in the United
States,” 2010 FORUM ON PUBLIC POLICY ONLINE, No. 5, pp. 9-11.
87
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rest. An interference with the freedom of a religious institution occurs when the law prevents the
institution from carrying out its religious function, such as a law prohibiting a religious
institution from employing only its adherents in the religious activities of the institution or a
zoning law prohibiting the construction of a religious facility in a residential area.
Applying the standard of “precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of an
individual or religious institution,” the courts have upheld a number of governmental actions
directed toward protecting religious freedom against Establishment Clause challenge. The
Supreme Court has upheld Title VII’s “religious entities” exemption,91 which exempts religious
institutions from Title VII’s religious discrimination prohibition and permits them to employ
individuals of the same religion to carry out the work of the institution, including the institution’s
non-profit secular activities92 The Court has also held that Title VII’s prohibition against
religious discrimination93 requires an employer to make a “reasonable accommodation” for an
employee’s religious beliefs, so long as this can be done without undue hardship on the conduct
of the employer’s business.94 It may be noted that the “reasonable accommodation” provision has
been interpreted very narrowly so as to meet the “precisely tailored” standard and so be
constitutionally permissible. For example, an employer was not required to accommodate a
Sabbatarian’s effort to avoid Saturday work when this would require the employer to disregard
the seniority system that had been provided for in the collective bargaining agreement.95 An
example of a required “reasonable accommodation” is where two Jewish employees of a skin
care salon had made a request two weeks in advance that they be permitted to take off work on
Yom Kippur, the holiest Jewish holiday, and where the employer could have reassigned or
rescheduled their previously-booked appointments.96 Another example of a “reasonable
accommodation” is the “substituted charity” provision of federal labor relations law, which
enables persons who have religious objections to joining unions to avoid paying union dues or
representation fees and instead make a charitable contribution in an equivalent amount.97
Other permissible actions designed to protect the religious freedom of individuals and
religious institutions include: an exemption from the former Sunday closing laws for
Sabbatarians who closed their businesses on Saturday;98 during Prohibition the exemption for
sacramental wine used in religious services, and a modern equivalent, the exemption from the
91

42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-1.
Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327
(1987).
93
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000e-2(a)(1).
94
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
95
Id.
96
See EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary,Inc., 108 F.3d 1569 (7 th Cir. 1997).
97
See e.g., Tooley v. Martin-Marietta Corp., 648 F.2d 1239 (9th Cir. 1981).
98
See e.g., Commonwealth of Kentucky v. Arlan’s Dep’t. Store, 357 S.W.2d 808 (Ky.1962), appeal dismissed, 371
U.S. 218 (1962). In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961), where the Court held that the state’s failure to
provide such an exemption did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, the Court noted that a number of states did
provide such an exemption, and noted that, “this may well be the wiser solution to the problem.” 366 U.S. at 608.
92
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federal substance abuse laws for the use of peyote in the religious ceremonies of NativeAmerican tribes;99an exemption from the federal Eagle Protection Act to permit members of
Native-American tribes to use eagle feathers in their religious services;100 the exemption in the
federal Humane Slaughter Law for Jewish religious slaughter and now for Halal religious
slaughter and for the religious slaughter of all religious faiths that use the severance of the
carotid artery method of slaughter;101 an exemption from social security self-employment taxes
for members of religious sects that have tenets opposed to participation in the social security
system and that provide reasonable support for their dependent members; 102; and an exemption
for Amish buggies from the requirement that slow-moving vehicles display a special emblem.103
And, of course, the government may take actions to protect the religious freedom of persons
subject to governmental control, such as the Dearborn, Michigan, public schools making
arrangements for their Moslem students to pray at required times during school hours, and the
military and prison systems trying to accommodate the religious needs of persons under their
control by providing them with chaplains, releasing them for religious services, excusing them
from uniform requirements, and enabling them to observe religious dietary restrictions.104
This brings us to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)105 and the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA).106 In an effort to
overcome the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to recognize a Free Exercise-based exemption for
99

See e.g., Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991); Olsen v. Drug Enforcement
Admin., 878 F.2d 1458 (D.C.Cir. 1989).
100
See Rupert v. Director, United States Fish and Wildlife Service, 957 F.2d 32 (1 st Cir.1992). In this case, the
exemption for the use of eagle feathers for religious purposes by members of Native-American tribes was
challenged by a member of an “all-race” church that followed Native-American religious customs, including the
ceremonial use of eagle feathers. They asserted that the exemption constituted a preference for one religion over
another, but the court was able to avoid the religious preference claim by finding that the exemption was based on
the sovereignty of the Native-American tribes and their special relationship to the federal government. 957 F.2d at
33-35. C.f. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (the federal government may give employment preference to
members of Native American tribes in the Bureau of Indian affairs). The courts have also relied on the sovereignty
and special relationship justification to avoid the religious preference claim in the peyote use cases, supra note 99. If
the peyote exemption had been for use by all religious groups, as opposed to ordinary drug users, there would be no
question but that it would be a constitutionally permissible means of protecting the religious liberty of individuals
and religious institutions. In Gonzales v. O Centro Esp.Benef. Uniao Do Vege., infra, note 108 , the Court referred
to the “well-established peyote exception”and noted that this exception “fatally undermines the Government’s
broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no
exceptions under RFRA.” 126 S.Ct. at 1222.
101
See Jones v. Butz, 374 F.Supp.1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
102
See Droz v. Commissioner of IRS, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995).
103
See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn.1990), holding that such an exemption was required by the
state constitution and did not violate the Establishment Clause.
104
See e.g., Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir.1985), rejecting an Establishment Clause challenge to the
military chaplaincy. Congress has by statute overturned the “uniform headgear” regulation upheld against Free
Exercise challenge by an observant Jewish service member seeking to wear a skullcap in Goldman v. Weinberger,
475 U.S. 503 (1986) , so as to permit the wearing of religiously-required headgear by military personnel. See 10
U.S.C. sec. 774 (1994).
105
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000bb et seq.
106
42 U.S.C. sec. 2000cc et seq.
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religiously-motivated conduct from laws of general application Clause and to protect the
religious liberty of individuals and religious institutions,107 Congress enacted the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993. The Act applied to all federal and state laws and provided that
whenever any law “substantially burdened” a person’s exercise of religion, the government had
to demonstrate that the law was in the furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and that
it was the least restrictive means of advancing that interest. This would be so even if the
“substantial burden” on a person’s exercise of religion resulted from a rule of general
applicability. In 1997, the Supreme Court held that the Act was unconstitutional in its application
to the states as being beyond Congress’ enforcement power under section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.108 In 2000,Congress came back with RLUIPA, 109a much narrower law enacted
under the spending power, and applicable only to programs or activities receiving federal
assistance. RLUIPA imposes the compelling governmental interest test to determine the validity
of land use regulations that impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person or
religious institution and the validity of institutional regulations that impose a substantial burden
on the religious practices of institutionalized persons.
In Cutter v. Wilkinson,110 the Supreme Court reviewed a lower court decision holding that
in its application to prison inmates, RLIPUA violated the Establishment Clause, because it
favored religious rights over other fundamental rights without any showing that religious rights
were at any greater risk of deprivation in the prison context.111 The Supreme Court unanimously
reversed that decision held that the application of RLUIPA to protect the religious practices of
the prison inmates that were at issue in that case did not violate the Establishment Clause. The
Court first noted that, it “has long recognized that the government may…accommodate religious
practices…without violating the Establishment Clause,” and that “‘there is room for play in the
joints between ‘ the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clauses, allowing the
government to accommodate religion beyond free exercise requirements, without offense to the
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See Employment Division v. Smith, supra note 90. In Smith the Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not
prohibit the government from burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws, and that laws
imposing such a burden did not have to be justified under the exacting compelling governmental interest standard of
review.
108
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA still applies to the application of federal laws.In Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418(2006), the Court applied RFRA to invalidate the
application of Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. sec. 812(c), Schedule I (c), to the use of
hoasca, a tea containing a hallucinogen, in the religious ceremonies of a very small sect in the United States. The
Court held that RFRA requires case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable laws and
that the government bears the burden of demonstrating that serious harm would result from the granting of specific
exemptions to particular religious claimants. The government could not sustain its burden in this case, The Court
also referred to the “well-established peyote exception,” discussed earlier, supra, note 99, and accompanying text,
and noted that this exception “fatally undermines the Government’s broader contention that the Controlled
Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA.” 546 U.S. at 43343
109
Supra, note 106.
110
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
111
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 423 F.3d 579 (6th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
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Establishment Clause.”112 It then noted that Congress had documented in hearings spanning
three years that “‘frivolous or arbitrary” barriers impeded institutionalized persons’ religious
exercise.”113The Court then found that on its face, RLUIPA “qualifies as a permissible legislative
accommodation of religion that is not barred by the Establishment Clause.”114 This was because
it “alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise” and
“protects institutionalized persons who are unable freely to attend to their religious needs and are
therefore dependent on the governments permission and accommodation for exercise of their
religion.”115 Moreover, RLUIPA would be applied in an “appropriately balanced way with
particular sensitivity to security concerns.”116 Finally, the Court concluded that the lower court
had misunderstood the Court’s precedents when it held that the government could not give
greater protection to religious rights than to other constitutionally protected rights. If this were
the law, said the Court, “all manner of religious accommodations would fail,” and the Court had
held in other cases, 117that religious accommodations need not “come packaged with benefits to
secular entities.”118 The Court thus upheld against Establishment Clause challenge the provisions
of RLUIPA requiring the state to make a reasonable accommodation for the religious needs of
institutionalized persons. The Court’s decision in Cutter v. Wilkinson strongly affirms the
principle that the government can, consistent with the Establishment Clause, take action that is
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.119
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The Supreme Court’s decision in Cutter upholding the constitutionality of the institutionalized persons provisions
of RLUIPA necessarily upholds the parallel land use provisions of RLUIPA. See e.g.,Westchester Day School v.
Village of Mamaroneck, 504 F.3d 338, 353-356 (2d Cir. 2007). There are four such provisions. One provision
provides that if a land use regulation substantially burdens the free exercise of religion, the government must show
that the burden serves a compelling governmental interest by the least restrictive means. Two provisions prohibit
discrimination against religious institutions. And one provision deals with exclusion by providing that a land use
regulation may not totally exclude religious assemblies or unreasonably limit religious assemblies, institutions or
structures within a jurisdiction. The substantial burden and equal terms provisions have been the most important and
the most frequently litigated. See the summary of the provisions and the discussion in Douglas Laycock and Luke
W. Goodrich, “RLUIPA: Necessary, Modest, and Under-Enforced,” 32 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 1021, 1023 (2012).
No cases involving the land use provisions of RLUIPA have yet reached the Supreme Court. In commenting on the
lower court RLUIPA cases, Laycock and Goodrich observed as follows: “Over the twelve years since its enactment,
RLUIPA has proven its worth. Churches have brought numerous successful lawsuits protecting their core First
Amendment rights and many cases have settled. Local officials are now on notice that they cannot treat churches as
a disfavored land use, despite the issues with NIMBY neighbors, tax collection, or commercial districts, or fear of
Muslims or other prejudices among their constituents.” Laycock & Goodrich, supra at 2071. For recent illustrative
cases involving RLUIPA challenges to land use regulation, see Bethel World Outreach Ministries v. Montgomery
County Council, 2013 U.S.App.LEXIS 2211, Jan. 31, 2013; Fortress Bible Church v. Feiner, 694 F.3d 208 (2d Cir.
2012); Centro Familiar Cristiano Buenas Nuevas v. City of Yuma, 651 F.3d 1163 (9 th Cir. 2011).

27

Forum on Public Policy

Conclusion
In this paper I have discussed the role of the Establishment Clause in protecting religious
freedom in the United States. I have explained that while the Establishment Clause has
sometimes been referred to as creating a “wall of separation” between church and state, the
concept of separation of church and state has not in theory or practice guided the Supreme
Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Rather the overriding principle of the Establishment
Clause has been that the government must maintain a course of complete official neutrality
toward religion. Under this overriding principle, the government cannot favor one religion over
another religion and cannot favor religious belief over non-religious belief. To put it another
way, under the Establishment Clause, the objectives to be achieved by the concept of separation
of church and state are achieved by the requirement of complete official neutrality toward
religion. This means that the government may become involved with religion in a number of
ways so long as it maintains a course of complete official neutrality toward religion.120
It is the thesis of this paper that the guiding force governing the Supreme Court’s
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has been a concern with protecting religious freedom. This
being so, I maintain that the Court has found an Establishment Clause violation only when the
law or governmental action in question has the potential for interfering with the religious
freedom of individuals or groups who are not the beneficiaries of that law or governmental
action. While the cases demonstrate that the Court has found many Establishment Clause
violations over the years, the Court has also upheld laws or governmental actions that have the
effect of treating religion equally with non-religion. This trend has been particularly evident in
recent years with respect to the government’s including the religious with the secular in the
receipt of governmental benefits. The Court has also upheld against Establishment Clause
challenge governmental actions that are precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of
individuals and religious institutions.
I have discussed the four situations where the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence
can be demonstrated to have been guided by a concern for protecting religious freedom. Two of
these situations are reflected in the cases where the Court has found an Establishment Clause
violation, and two of these situations are reflected in the situations where the Court has not found
an Establishment Clause violation. The Court has held unconstitutional under the Establishment
Clause all governmental actions that have had the effect of favoring one religious belief over
another religious belief or of favoring religious belief over non-religious belief. In so doing, the
Court has protected the religious freedom of those persons who do not share the favored
religious beliefs.121 The Court has also protected the religious freedom of religious institutions
and their adherents by holding that under the Establishment Clause the government cannot
120
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See the discussion, supra, notes 5-11, and accompanying text.
See the discussion, supra, notes 12-27, and accompanying text.
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become involved in matters of religious doctrine or policy and must respect the religiously-based
decisions of religious institutions.122 At the same time, the Court has held that at least in some
circumstances, the Establishment Clause permits the government to include the religious with the
secular in the receipt of governmental benefits, and to that extent the Establishment Clause
protects the religious freedom of religious institutions and religious adherents.123 Finally, the
Court has held that the Establishment Clause permits the government to take actions that are
precisely tailored to protect the religious freedom of individuals and religious institutions.124
The Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions under the Establishment Clause, holding
what it is that the Establishment Clause prohibits and what it is that the Establishment Clause
permits, have strongly reinforced and advanced the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom
in the United States.
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